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THE EXPANDING REACH OF THE
EXECUTIVE IN FOREIGN DIRECT
INVESTMENT: HOW RALLS V CFIUS
WILL ALTER THE FDI LANDSCAPE IN
THE UNITED STATES
HUNTER DEELEY

"

The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States ("CFIUS"
or the "Committee") is a little known regulatory body in the Treasury
Department with an almost limitless mandate: protect the nation's
securityfrom threats arisingfrom Foreign Direct Investment ("FDI").
CFIUS began through Presidential Order as a tiny interagency body
that would monitor investment trends and advise on related policy
decisions. Despite objectionsfrom the Committee, Congress increased
CFIUS's power over the years in response to growing concerns over
the influx offoreign capital. At various points, the Presidentattempted
to head off a Legislative fix with an Executive Order that reflected a
concern for remaining open to foreign investment. It wasn't enough.
This Comment discusses the evolution of CFIUS from its role as a
monitoring body to its present day position as a gatekeeper to the U.S.
economy. With the recent Ralls v. CFIUS court ruling affirming the
President's broad authority to suspend or prohibitcertain transactions
for nationalsecurity reasons, the Committee will only grow strongeras
more companies submit proposed investments for review out of an
abundance of caution. Following the Ralls ruling, if the Committee
hopes to promote a climate of open investment, it will need to adapt and
provide a more clarified position on what is subject to review. "We
might as well face the situation. We cannot supply all the required
capital in the United States. We must look to European countriesfor
assistance, and while this demand for capital continues, we should be
most careful not to frighten that capitalfrom our shores.

* Senior Note and Comment Editor, American University Business Law Review,
Volume 4; J.D. Candidate May 2015, American University Washington College of
Law; B.A. Foreign Affairs, May 2008, University of Virginia. Thank you to all those
who worked on this piece, especially my friends and colleagues on the BLR and my
editor Christian DeRoo. Most importantly, thank you to my family for their love,
support, and endless encouragement during law school.
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INTRODUCTION

In 1914, the total stock of foreign investments in the U.S. economy made
up about one-fifth of annual Gross Domestic Product (GDP). 2 That same
year, foreign direct investment (FDI) in the United States reached $1.3
billion in nominal terms. 3 Since the turn of the twentieth century, FDI has
played a vital role in the development and modernization of the United
States economy. 4
According to the White House, foreign firms in the United States
currently employ 5.6 million people, totaling 4.1 percent of the privateTO 1914 190 (1989) (quoting Address of W. W. Miller of Hornblower, Miller & Potter
to the first Annual Meeting of the Investment Banker's Association of America, Report
ofMeeting, 48 (1912)).
2.

See EDWARD M. GRAHAM & DAVID M. MARCHICK, U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY

AND FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 3 (2006) (clarifying that this percentage represents
portfolio investments, which are defined as an equity investor who exerts no
managerial control over the investment).
3.
See, e.g., id. at I (discussing the early emergence of national security concerns
by the U.S. government over the large presence of foreign investment in the U.S.
economy).
4.
See id. at 2-3 (noting Carnegie Steel began as a foreign investment until
Andrew Carnegie became a U.S. citizen and mentioning the role FDI played in the
development of industries such as telecommunications and transportation); see also
WILKINS, supra note 1, at 190 (discussing the role of foreign investment in the
development of the railroad and how this opened up new markets for foreign
investment including land and mining).
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sector workforce.5 Compensation at these U.S.-based foreign affiliates is
consistently higher than the economic average. 6 Additionally, these firms
account for almost a third of all U.S. imports.7 In an effort to highlight the
benefits of FDI, the administration released a study in October 2013
breaking down the essential role foreign capital plays in the U.S.

The White House commissioned study is part of the
economy.
administration's broader initiative to buck the recent downward trend in
FDI and make sure the U.S. remains an attractive location for foreign
investors. 9

FDI dropped sharply in 2012 after a slow climb following the Great
Recession of 2008.o Foreign companies invested $166 billion in the U.S.
economy in 2012; this represents a 28 percent drop, or $66 billion decrease,
compared to 2011.11 While numbers have been down since 2008, the
United States continues to be the world's largest recipient of FDI, a title it
has held since 2006.12 However, America's place at the top is not as secure
when looking at the latest trends.1 3 The United States saw a 22 percent

&

See Press Release, The White House, New Report: Foreign Direct Investment
5.
in the United States (Oct. 31, 2013), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2013/10/31/new-report-foreign-direct-investment-united-states (noting one third
of these jobs are in the manufacturing sector).
6.
See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE & PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS,
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 8 (2013) (specifying pay
averaged around $77,000 per employee in 2011 at U.S. based affiliates compared to
$58,000 for the economy as a whole).
See id. (highlighting how these firms connect the United States to the global
7.
economy and contribute to the negative trade balance by importing 28.4 percent of total
U.S. imports).
8.
See id. (explaining that FDI strengthens the economy by supporting jobs,
expanding exports, and funding research and development); see also TAZEEM PASHA
RACHEL CRABTREE, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES: DRIVERS OF

at
available
(2013),
1,
COMPETITIVENESS
ECONOMIC
U.S.
http://www.selectusa.commerce.gov/.
See James Politi, Barack Obama Mounts Big Push to Bolster FDJ in US, FIN.
9.
TIMES (Oct. 27, 2013, 5:21 PM), available at http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/c5l19
344-3f~a- l le3-b665-00144feabdcO.html#axzz2pa87zrGt (mentioning President Obama
attending the Commerce Department's first ever conference aimed at bringing together
foreign investors, US economic development agencies, and state and local officials).
10. See JAMES K. JACKSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS 21857, FOREIGN DIRECT
INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS ii-I (2013) (noting
global FDI inflows in 2012 were down 18 percent from 2011 as well).
11. See id. at 3 ("Foreign Direct Investment in the United States dropped sharply
in 2012 after rebound[ing] slowly in 2010 and 2011 after falling from the $310 billion
recorded in 2008.").
12. See, e.g., Press Release, The White House, supra note 5 (citing, among other
reasons, the world's largest consumer market, a skilled workforce, and desirable legal
protections).
13. See Brenda Cronin, Shrinking Share of Overseas Cash Headed to U.S., WALL
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drop in FDI during the first two quarters of 2013 compared with the same
time in 2012.14 Whether this drop is a reflection of a global downward
trend in FDI or evidence of investor uncertainty in the U.S. market (or a
combination) is unclear.' 5
Regardless, the trend was enough to force a reaction from the Obama
Administration.1 6 The new initiative is recognition that the United States
needs to do more if it wishes to remain competitive for global capital., 7 In
the past, the reasons for investing in America may have been "selfevident," but the study calls for an effort to build upon what has historically
made the United States a popular destination for investors, including "an
open investment regime" and a "predictable and stable regulatory"
landscape. 8
Nestled away in the Treasury Department is a little known interagency
committee that has the potential to complicate this "open" and
"predictable" investment landscape.
The Committee on Foreign
Investment in the United States (hereinafter "CFIUS" or "the Committee"),
is charged with keeping the United States secure from threats to national

&

ST. J. (Dec. 8, 2013, 5:00 PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB 10001424052702
303722104579242302568186732 (noting while the United States remains the largest
recipient of FDI, trends show the United States is losing out to developing economies).
14.
See JAMES K. JACKSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERv., RS 21857, FOREIGN DIRECT
INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 3 (2013). (stating further
that 2013 FDI rates likely would lag behind 2012 rates for the remainder of the year);
cf Cronin, supra note 13 (mentioning a United Nations forecast stating global FDI
would not pick up until after 2013).
15. See Cronin, supra note 13 ("America's smaller slice of global FDI 'is a
worrying indicator that our policy environment is ...
unattractive,' said Matthew
Slaughter, a professor at Dartmouth's Tuck School of Business. It also reflects that
companies have 'multiple opportunities around the world."').
16. See James Politi & Russell Birkett, US FDI: The Numbers the White House
Wishes Were Bigger, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 30, 2013, 6:16 PM), http://www.ft.com/cms/
s/0/fc754c20-4187-Il e3-9073-00144feabdcO.html#slide0 (describing President Obama
as a salesman for "brand USA" at a conference designed to attract more investment
from abroad).
17. Cf Politi, supra note 9 (mentioning the involvement of three Cabinet level
Secretaries and the United States Trade Representative in the Commerce Department's
event, which shows a coordinated approach between various governmental agencies
designed to spur investment). But see Eli Lehrer, Actions, Not Obama Rhetoric, Will
Lure FDI Back to the U.S., REAL CLEAR MKTS. (Nov.
11, 2013),
http://wwwl.realclearmarkets.com/printpage/?url=http://www.realclearmarkets.com/art
icles/2013/l 1/1 I/actions not obama rhetoric will lure fdi back to the us100722.h
tml (arguing there is a disconnect between the President's attempts to attract more FDI
and certain policies including a proposed tariff on the insurance industry).
18. See Politi, supra note 9 (noting the self-evident reason for investors was
America's status as the world's largest economy); see also U.S DEP'T OF COMMERCE
PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, supra note 6, at 8.
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security masked as legitimate inward bound investment.1 9 CFIUS has the
statutory authority "to review transactions that could result in control of a
U.S. business by a foreign person, in order to determine the effect of such
transactions on the national security of the United States." 2 0 Whether the
parties submit to a review voluntarily is immaterial; the Conmmittee
possesses the power to unilaterally initiate proceedings for any covered
transaction.21
Under 50 U.S.C. § 2170, the Defense Production Act, CFIUS can take
up to thirty days to review a covered transaction in order to determine its
effects on national security.22 If it finds that the covered transaction
threatens to impair the national security of the U.S., that any concerns have
not been mitigated during the review period, or that the deal would result in
foreign control of critical infrastructure, CFIUS can then take another 45
23
Following the end of this period, the
days to investigate the matter.
President that he take action on the
to
the
Committee can recommend
24
covered transaction.
The President must decide within fifteen days

.

19. See Holly Shulman, CFIUS at a Glance, TREASURY NOTES (Feb. 19, 2013),
("The
http://www.treasury.gov/connect/blog/Pages/CFIUS-at-a-Glance.aspx
Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) has only one purpose:
to review the potential national security effects of transactions in which a foreign
company obtains control of a U.S. company.").
20.
The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, U.S. DEP'T OF THE
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/intemational/Pages/CommitteeTREASURY,
on-Foreign-Investment-in-US.aspx (last updated Dec. 20, 2012).
See 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(b)(1)(D)(i) (2012) ("[T]he President or the
21.
Committee may initiate a review under subparagraph (A) of- (i) any covered
transaction); see also 31 C.F.R. § 800.207 (2008) (defining a covered transaction as
"any transaction ... by or with any foreign person, which could result in control of a
U.S. business by a foreign person).
22.
See 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(b)(1)(E) (2012) (noting the thirty day timeline
begins at the time written notice from a party is accepted by the chairperson or the
initiation of a unilateral review); see also 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(f) (2012) (listing
factors for consideration when determining a transaction's impact on national security
including "domestic production needed for national defense;" "the capability and
capacity of domestic industries to meet national defense requirements;" the transactions
effects on "major energy assets;" and "potential national security-related effects on . .
critical infrastructure").
23. See 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(b)(2)(A)-(B) (2012) (requiring the Committee to
immediately conduct an investigation when any a covered transaction meets any one
factor); see also 31 C.F.R. § 800.503(b) (2008) ("The Committee shall also undertake,
after review of a covered transaction ... an investigation ... that: (2) Would result in
control by a foreign person of critical infrastructure of or within the United States[.]").
24.
Exec. Order No. 13,456, Sec. 6(c) (2008) (stating the Committee will send a
report to the President requesting his action); see also 31 C.F.R. § 800.506(c) (2008)
(requiring CFIUS include in the report information stating there is credible evidence
that the foreign interest exercising control might take action to impair the nation's
security).
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whether or not to suspend or prohibit the transaction.25
Despite publicity over recent high-profile acquisitions, CFIUS remains
hidden in the shadows of the government's national security apparatus. 2 6 it
is not the weak Committee President Gerald Ford established forty years
27
Today, CFIUS is a strong, secretive regulatory body with the
ago.
potential to undermine the economic policies that the Obama
administration claims makes the United States the number one destination
for FDI. Until CIFUS adopts clear policies, foreign companies looking to
acquire U.S. businesses will be forced to navigate an opaque regulatory
landscape scattered with loosely defined terms, determinations based on
classified information, and decisions that offer little to no redress.28
This Comment argues that the District Court for the District of
Columbia, in a case of first impression, inadvertently strengthened
CFIUS's reach beyond its historical scope. By affirming the President's
expanded authority to limit FDI for the sake of national security, the
District Court all but mandated that foreign companies interested in
securing a foothold within the U.S. market submit for review under CFIUS
prior to any potential deal. While submitting to a review does not
automatically mean the Committee will investigate, more submissions
grant the Committee the appearance of precedential authority, which
creates a snowball effect and elicits more submissions from the private
sector. It was never intended for CFIUS to be a catch-all for foreign
acquisitions of U.S. companies; it has always been a body designed to
review the exceptional.
However, with this latest ruling, ordinary
transactions are subject to higher scrutiny, requiring parties to a deal to
exercise extreme caution.
This Comment begins in Section II by exploring the evolution of the
Committee from a body charged with making policy recommendations to
an opaque regulator with authority to review and railroad investments on
25.

See 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(d)(2) (2012) (specifying the President shall

announce his decision no later than fifteen days after an investigation is completed).
26. See 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(c) (2012) (exempting any information or materials
filed in a CFIUS review from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act, 5
U.S.C. § 552, and stating no materials will be made public unless required for an
administrative orjudicial action).
27. See generally Exec. Order No. 11,858, 3 C.F.R. (1971-1975) (creating the
Committee through Executive Order).
28.
Compare 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170 (2012) (noting the involvement of intelligence
assessments from the Director of National Intelligence and Congress's decision that
actions by the President shall not be subject to judicial review), with 31 C.F.R. §
800.208 (2008) (leaving the essential term "critical infrastructure" broadly defined),
and 50 U.S.C. § 2170(f)( 1) (2012) (listing factors to consider for determining impacts
on national security including an open ended category of "such other factors" deemed
to be appropriate in the eyes of the President and Committee).
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behalf of foreign nationals. It highlights the Executive's desire to limit the
scope and review the power of CFIUS through Executive Orders and policy
shifts. It shows how Congress responded each time by further empowering
the Committee through legislation. Section III looks at the Court's
affirmation of the President's broad authority under FINSA in the Rails
It argues the Rails ruling increases the unpredictability of
ruling.
government action for covered transactions and shows that investors have
little choice but to submit for a review. Section III also explores the
expanding definition of "critical infrastructure," a result of parties to nontraditional and high value covered transactions filing with CFIUS. It also
argues foreign investors are on an uneven playing field in deals where a
domestic competitor might show interest. Finally, Section IV offers ways
the Committee could make itself appear more open to FDI while
maintaining the requisite national security balance needed to keep the
nation's critical infrastructure safe.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CFIUS REVIEW PROCESS

CFIUS today is a far cry from the Committee's initial mandate over forty
years ago; it did not transform into a boundless regulatory body
In order to understand the surprising nature of the
overnight. 2 9
Committee's newly acquired powers, it is necessary to first trace its
evolution from a passive advisor on investment policies to an active
gatekeeper, suspicious of foreign individuals, entities, and governments
looking to enter the U.S. market.
A. The Reviewer Becomes a Regulator
Under President Gerald Ford, Executive Order No. 11858 founded
CFIUS in 1975.30 Worried that Congress would create a body with
excessive power to regulate FDI from OPEC countries, Ford's Executive
Order preempted the Legislative Branch and created a Committee with
limited powers. 3 1 The directive charged the Committee with "monitoring"

29.
Compare Exec. Order No. 11,858, 3 C.F.R. 990 (1971-1975) (using passive
language such as "monitoring" and "coordinating"), with 31 C.F.R. § 800.801 (2013)
(using active language such as "suspend[ing]," "prohibit[ing]," and "mitigat[ing]").
30. Exec. Order No. 11,858, supra note 27 at section 1 (stating membership would
consist of representatives at the Assistant Secretary level or above from the
Departments of State, Treasury, Commerce, Defense, the Assistant to the President for
Economic Affairs, and the Executive Director of the Council on International
Economic Policy).
31. See, e.g., David Zaring, CFIUS as a CongressionalNotification Service, 83 S.
CAL. L. REv. 81, 92-93 (2009) (discussing Ford's worry over Congressional legislation
impacting FDI originating from OPEC countries following the end of the 1975 oil
embargo).
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FDI and "coordinating" related policy in the U.S. 3 2
For much of its early life, the Committee embraced its limited role.33
The Treasury Department, prior to CFIUS's first meeting, commissioned a
study to look at policy implications of the growing level of FDI within U.S.
borders. 34 Among the key issues addressed were whether recent OPEC
investments within the U.S. could impact U.S. foreign and domestic policy,
and whether regulations in place at the time could address concerns over
"undesirable behavior by foreign investors or undesirable foreign
investment."35 From the beginning, the Committee recognized the impact
on public perception caused by reviews of specific transactions. 36 The
Committee also noted that it never intended to review transactions as a
matter of course simply because the proposed deal involved a foreign
government or a company in the defense sector. 3 7 Accordingly, the
Committee only met six times over the first four years of its existence.38
It was not until the late 1980s that a growing concern among members of
Congress pushed the Committee into uncharted territory.39 Prior to this
point, the Committee continually touted the importance of the Executive's
32. See Exec. Order No. 11,858, supra note 27 at section 1(b)(3) (stating in order
to effectuate these responsibilities, the Committee would review investments with
major implications for United States national interests).
See FederalResponse to OPEC Country Investments in the United States (Part
33.
2, Investment in Sensitive Sectors of the U.S. Economy: Kuwait Petroleum Corporation
Takeover of Santa Fe International Corporation): Hearings Before Commerce,
Consumer, and Monetary Affairs Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on Gov't. Operations,
97th Cong. 4 (1981) (statement of Marc E. Leland, Assistant Secretary for Internal
Affairs, U.S. Department of the Treasury) ("The CFlUS is a monitoring body. It has
not been given authority to approve or disapprove foreign investments in the United
States.").
34. See The Operations of Federal Agencies in Monitoring, Reporting on, and
Analyzing Foreign Investments in the U.S. (Part3, Examination of the Committee on
Foreign Investments in the U.S.): HearingBefore Commece, Consumer, and Monetary
Affairs Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on Gov't. Operations, 96th Cong. 248-54 (1979)
(assessing the growing level of FDI capital within the existing regulatory and policy
landscape and recommending four options for future U.S. policy toward FDI).
35. See id. at 248 (clarifying that undesirable foreign investment includes
investment concentrated in a particular industry of great importance to the nation's
security).
36.
See id. at 283 (highlighting that a review might suggest the U.S. Government
is less than neutral on the particular transaction or on FDI in general).
See id. at 281 (making note that existing safeguards were thought adequate to
37.
deal with transactions involving companies in the defense sector).
38.
See id. (stating two of those meetings involved foreign government backed
investments by Romania and Iran, investments that the Committee ultimately did not
find problematic).
39. See Zaring, supra note 31, at 93 (discussing Congressional concerns over the
growing level of FDI originating from Japan in the 1980s and frustration with CFIUS
and the infrequency of the Committee's meetings).
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policy toward open investment in the United States and pointed to other
regulatory tools capable of addressing concerns related to controversial
FDIs.4 o In the event a proposed transaction caused legitimate concerns, the
Justice Department could block it on antitrust grounds; the Department of
Defense could sever sensitive contracts or withhold security clearances
from the foreign acquirer; and the Department of Commerce could use
export control laws to prevent the transfer of sensitive technology into
foreign hands.41
In 1988, Congress passed the Exon-Florio provision to the Defense
Production Act.42 Congress gave the President the authority, which it
presumably wished the Executive had back when President Ford issued
Executive Order No. 11858 in 1975. The amendment granted the President
the power to take "such action for such time as the President considers
appropriate to suspend or prohibit any covered transaction that threatens to
impair the national security of the United States."43 That same year,
President Reagan delegated administration of the authority vested in the
President under Exon-Florio to CFIUS.44 After thirteen years, CFIUS
finally had statutory power to suspend or prohibit, by recommendation to
the President, a deal which threatened national security. 45 It was a power
the Committee previously felt was unnecessary and now felt should not
expand.46 Congress disagreed.

&

40. See Foreign Takeovers and National Security: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Commerce, Consumer Prot., & Competitiveness of the H. Comm. on Energy
Commerce, 100th Cong. 16-17 (1987) (statement of J. Michael Farren, Deputy Under
Secretary for International Trade, U.S. Department of Commerce) [hereinafter Foreign
Takeovers and National Security] (testifying the CFlUS system in place at the time was
working and warning that further regulatory action would have a negative economic
impact on FDI and possibly on U.S. investment abroad).
41. See, e.g., id. (discussing prior instances where transactions with potential
national security concerns were adequately addressed through existing control regimes
under the Departments of Justice and Defense).
42. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170 (2012).
43. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(d)(1) (2012); see also 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(d)(3)
(2012) (granting the President the power to use the Attorney General to implement his
order under § 2170(d)(1)).
44. See Exec. Order No. 12,661, 3 C.F.R. 618 (1988) (delegating duties to CFIUS
in order to better achieve the economic, foreign policy, and national security objectives
of the United States).
45. See id. pt. III § 3-201 (instructing CFIUS to present the President with a
unanimous recommendation for action following the completion of an investigation
and requiring a report detailing differing views in the event unanimity cannot be
reached).
46.
Compare Foreign Takeovers and National Security, supra note 40, at 17-18
(noting the pre Exon-Florio review system was designed to review transactions and
then recommend other USG regulatory regimes take action and stating these existing
regulatory regimes were sufficient to address any national security problems); with
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B. Unwanted Empowerment
In May 1992, Senator Robert Byrd criticized what he believed to be
CFIUS inaction under Exon-Florio.47 He introduced S. 2704 "to prevent
any foreign person from purchasing or otherwise acquiring the LTV
Aerospace and Defense Co." 48 He argued the proposed sale of the
company's missile division to a French company amounted to "the French
Government nationaliz[ing]" the United States' defense industry. 49 While
the proposed legislation failed, Senator Byrd succeeded in passing a later
version requiring CFIUS to investigate proposed deals when "the acquirer
is controlled by or acting on behalf of a foreign government; and the
acquisition results in the control of a person engaged in interstate
commerce in the United States that could affect the national security of the
United States."5 o It was the first time the Committee was required to
investigate a proposed deal.
C. Dubai and FINSA
From 1992 until December 2007, CFIUS investigated twenty-four
potential deals out of 1,176 notifications filed with the Committee.5 ' Its
decision not to investigate the acquisition of the Peninsula and Oriental
Steamship Navigation Company ("P&O") by Dubai Ports ("DP") World,
however, drew harsh Congressional criticism spurring further changes. 52
Oversight of the Exon-Florio Amendment: Hearing Before S. Comm. on Commerce,
Sci., and Transp., 102d Cong. 6 (1991) (statement of Olin Wethington, Assistant
Secretary for International Affairs, U.S. Department of the Treasury) (noting ExonFlorio's effective implementation and concerns that further restrictions and
"burdensome regulations" in the name of national security interests might deter FDI).
47. See 138 CONG. REc. S6599 (daily ed. May 13, 1992) (statement of Sen. Byrd)
(criticizing CFIUS for reviewing just 13 of 700 foreign acquisitions in the four years
following Exon-Florio and highlighting the President's decision not to use his broad
authority afforded to him under the statute).
48. See S. 2704, 102d Cong. (as referred to the Committee on Banking, May 13,
1992) (defining "foreign person" very broadly to include organizations, corporations,
or individuals of a foreign country).
49.
138 CONG. REC. S6599, supra note 47 (expressing worries that U.S. investors
could not outbid foreign governments looking to invest in ailing defense firms in a
contracting industry).
50.
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993, Pub. L. No. 102484, 106 Stat. 2315 (1992) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 2170 (2012)).
51.
See cf Zaring, supra note 31, at 103 (table) (showing a correlation between a
change in the CFIUS process and an increase in the number of notifications submitted
to CFIUS).
52.
See Briefing by Representatives from the Departments and Agencies
Represented on the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) to
Discuss the National Security Implications of the Acquisition of Peninsular and
OrientalSteamship Navigation Company by Dubai Ports World, A Government-Owned
and Controlled Firm of the United Arab Emirates (UAE): Hearing Before the S.
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CFIUS took the 30-day review period to look into DP World's acquisition
of U.K. based P&O, a company operating many of the ports in the United
States. 3 It ultimately decided not to investigate the deal, finding that
although DP World was a state-backed company, it posed no unresolved
threat to national security.54
President George W. Bush, in another attempt by the Executive to
preempt legislative action, instituted a policy leaving open the opportunity
for CFIUS to review previously closed transactions for national security
purposes. 5
However, Congress acted the following year to pass the
Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007, commonly known
as FINSA.s' FINSA represented the latest legislative "fix" to CFIUS and
ushered in the regulatory process facing overseas investors today.57
FINSA left in place many of the past Congressional adjustments under
the Exon-Florio amendment; however, it also empowered the Committee
by broadening definitions and extending the Committee's reach into new
FINSA widened the definition of "national security" to
industries. 8
Comm. on Armed Services, 109th Cong. 6 (2006) [hereinafter Dubai Ports World
Briefing] (remarks by Sen. Hilary Clinton) (expressing concerns that the statutory
requirements necessitating a 45 day investigation were not followed despite port
security concerning the nation's security and the Dubai government controlling DP
World).
53. See Jessica Holzer, Was the Law Followed on Dubai Ports Deal OK?, FORBES,
(Feb. 23, 2006, 6:00 AM), http://www.forbes.com/2006/02/22/logistics-ports-dubaicx jh_0223cfius.html (describing the Committee's thirty day review of the transaction
as a rubber stamp). But see Dubai Ports World Briefing, supra note 52 at 11-12
(statement of Robert Kimmit, Deputy Secretary, U.S. Department of the Treasury)
(testifying the DP World review was not rushed and noting that the parties and CFIUS
engaged in almost two months of informal talks prior to the start of the thirty day
statutory review period).
54. See Holzer, supra note 53 (pointing to the statutory provision allowing CFIUS
to sign off on a deal after thirty days when the Committee determines the deal does not
threaten national security); see also Press Release, The White House, Fact Sheet: The
CFIUS Process and the DP World Transaction (Feb. 22, 2006), available at
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2006/02/20060222-1 .html
(announcing the President firmly stood behind the review and the decision to allow the
deal to proceed).
55. See Jeremy Pelofsky, UPDATE I - Businesses Object to US Move on Foreign
Investment, REUTERS (Dec. 6, 2006, 12:49 AM), http://uk.reuters.com/article/2006/12/
06/usa-investment-idUKNO534982920061206 (describing private sector concerns over
CFIUS requiring French based Alcatel SA to sign a national security agreement (NSA)
prior to its acquisition of US-based Lucent Technologies, a telecommunications
company, permitting the government to undo the deal if the parties failed to comply at
any time with the NSA).
56. See generally Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007, Pub. L.
No. 110-49, 121 Stat. 246 (2007).
57. See 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170 (2012) (noting no subsequent amendments since the
passage of FINSA in 2007).
58. See 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(a)(5)-(7) (2012) (expanding the definition of
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include homeland security and inserted a new "trigger" for when the
Committee must investigate: when a deal will result in foreign "control of
any critical infrastructure." 59 Furthermore, Congress ordered the Director
of National Intelligence ("DNI") to conduct his own analysis of any
potential threats to national security posed by a covered transaction.60
D. Wind Farms Are NationalSecurity Interests
On September 28, 2012, President Obama, citing national security
concerns and acting under the statutory authority vested in him through 50
U.S.C. § 2170(d)(1), ordered Ralls Corporation to divest all interests in
four wind farm project companies in Oregon. 6 1 It was the first time a
president took such action in twenty-two years.62
Ralls, owned by two Chinese Nationals who also were officers in the
Chinese manufacturing company Sany Group, purchased the wind farm
project companies from Terna Energy USA Holding Corporation in March
of 2012.63 The four wind farms were in close proximity to restricted
airspace used by the U.S. Navy for drone test flights and other electronic
warfare aircraft.64 Ralls did not submit the deal to CFIUS for review prior
to the purchase and did so only after members of the Committee contacted

national security to include homeland security and broadly defining critical
infrastructure and critical technologies).
See Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-49
59.
at Sec. 2(a)(5), (b)(2)(B)(i)(I); see also 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2170(a)(5)-(6), (b)(2)(B)
(2012) (defining critical infrastructure as "systems and assets, whether physical or
virtual, so vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems
or assets would have a debilitating impact on national security").
See 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(b)(4) (2012) (limiting the DNI's review to no
60.
longer than twenty days after the Committee has accepted notice of the transaction and
directing the DNI to include any relevant intelligence agencies in its assessment).
See 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(d)(1) (2012); Regarding the Acquisition of Four
61.
U.S. Wind Farm Project Companies by Rails Corporation, 77 Fed. Reg. 60,281, 60,282
(Oct. 3, 2012) ("There is credible evidence that leads me to believe that Rails
Corporation ... through exercising control of [the Project Companies] . . . might take
action that threatens to impair the national security of the United States.").
See Helene Cooper, Obama Orders Chinese Company to End Investment at
62.
Sites Near Drone Base, N.Y. TIMES, A16, Sept. 28, 2012, available at,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/29/us/politics/chinese-company-ordered-to-give-upstake-in-wind-farms-near-navy-base.html?_r-0 (describing President Obama's decision
as an example of his increasingly tougher approach to dealing with China).
63. See Rails Corp. v. Comm. on Foreign Inv. in the United States, 926 F. Supp.
2d 71, 78 (D.D.C. 2013) (stating Tema owned four separate limited liability
companies, each of which was associated with a particular five-turbine wind farm
project in north-central Oregon).
64. See Cooper, supra note 62 (highlighting U.S. Government concerns over drone
use expanding to their foreign governments and noting the potential for the Chinese
government to collect intelligence o drone technology form the wind farm sites).
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Ralls and invited the company to file a voluntary notice.65 As a result,
Ralls invested substantial amounts of time and money into the project prior
to the Committee's recommendation that the President issue the Executive
Order. 6 6 Following the end of the forty-five day investigation period,
President Obama issued his directive ordering the divestiture. 67
Ralls filed suit challenging the Presidential Order arguing the President
exceeded the statutory authority granted to him under Section 721 of the
Defense Production Act. 68 Specifically, Ralls argued the President could
not: (1) order the company to remove items from the wind farms, (2) block
access by foreign nationals to the wind farms, (3) prohibit the sale of the
property to a third party until removal of the items, and (4) authorize
CFIUS to implement burdensome measures 'that would allegedly protect
United States' national security interests. 69
The District Court for the District of Columbia disagreed. According to
the ruling, Ralls' interpretation of Section 721(d)(1) of the Defense
Production Act does not limit the President only to the "suspen[sion]" or

65.
Compare Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss, Rails
Corp. v. Obama, No. 1:12-CV-015130-ABJ, 2013 WL 1334728 at *3 (D.D.C. Mar. 21,
2013) (describing a phone call from Deputy Assistant Secretary Mark Jaskowiak and
Rails's representatives stating the Department of Defense would file an agency notice if
Rails decided not to voluntarily submit for a review), with Amended Complaint at ¶ 74,
Rails Corp. v. Obama, No. 1:12-CV-01513-ABJ (D.D.C. Oct. 1, 2013) (stating Rails
had one opportunity to meet with CFIUS when the review began and were not provided
with any information or notice of any potential national security concerns).
66. See Plaintiffs Response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at 3-4, Rails Corp.
v. Obama, No. 1:12-CV-01513-ABJ (D.D.C. Apr. 8, 2013) (stating Rails engaged in
direct talks with the U.S. Navy and agreed to move one windfarm at its own expense in
order to reduce conflicts with low level aircraft training and noting Rails secured local
land use permits with the Navy's support); see also Amended Complaint at ¶% 63-65,
Rails Corp. v. Obama, No. 1:12-CV-01513-ABJ (D.D.C. Oct. 01, 2012). (stating the
US Navy appreciated Rails's "cooperation and consideration" in moving certain
windfarms).
67. See Regarding the Acquisition of Four U.S. Wind Farm Project Companies by
Rails Corporation, 77 Fed. Reg. 60,281, 60,282 (Oct. 3, 2012); cf Cooper, supra note
62 (basing her discussion on the reasons for the President's decision on speculation
from industry analysts and prior U.S. government intelligence activities). But see
Plaintiffs' Response to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, supra note 66, at 19-23
(discussing the governmental interest in neither disclosing the reasons for the
President's decision nor the evidence upon which it is based).
68.
See generally Ralls Corp., 926 F. Supp. 2d at 82; see also Amended
Complaint, supra note 65, at ¶% 133-39 (arguing Ultra Vires action facially violating
the statute and regulations).
69.
See Ralls Corp., 926 F. Supp. 2d at 82-83 (noting Rails contested the legality
of government inspections and reviews of financial data, equipment, and employees);
see also Regarding the Acquisition of Four U.S. Wind Farm Project Companies by
Rails Corporation, 77 Fed. Reg. at 60,281, 60,282.
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"prohibit[ion]" of a transaction.7 ' Rather, "the statute expressly authorizes
the President to do what he deems necessary to accomplish or implement
the prohibition - not merely issue it." 71 Furthermore, since the President's
actions "flell] well within the scope" of the statutory language, "their
imposition was a Presidential action under subsection (d)(1) of the statute,
and those actions have been declared unreviewable by Congress." 72
On July 15, 2014, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
ruled that Congress did not intend to preclude Ralls' constitutional due
process claim from judicial review. While this ruling overturned the lower
court, in dicta, the Court of Appeals noted the statute bars courts from
reviewing the President's actions taken to suspend or prohibit a transaction.
A constitutional challenge to the process leading up to these actions is
reviewable by the courts, however.
E.

Pork: Smells Like a Threat

Shuanghui International, a Chinese company, and Smithfield Food, Inc.,
a U.S. based pork producer, announced in May 2013 that Shuanghui would
acquire all outstanding shares of Smithfield in a deal valued around $4.7
billion.73 On the same day of the announcement, Smithfield CEO Larry
Pope announced the parties' intentions to voluntarily file for review by
CFIUS stating the decision was motivated by "an abundance of caution." 74
Pope's voluntary submission was a chance to take advantage of what
CFIUS experts refer to as the "safe harbor" provision.s CFIUS regulations

See Ralls Corp., 926 F. Supp. 2d at 88-89 (stating Ralls's interpretation is
70.
flawed because statutes are never to be interpreted in a manner where the interpretation
renders any part meaningless); see also 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(d)(1) (2012).
71.
Ralls Corp., 926 F. Supp. 2d at 88-89 (describing the President's authority as
"extremely broad"); see also 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(d)(1) (2012).
72. Ralls Corp., 926 F. Supp. 2d at 89 (stating the challenged action is the type
that is shielded from review); see also 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(d)(1) (2012).
See Press Release, Smithfield Int'l Holdings, Shuanghui Int'l & Smithfield
73.
Foods Agree to Strategic Combination Creating Leading Global Pork Enterprise (May
available at http://investors.smithfieldfoods.com/releasedetail.cfm?
29, 2013),
ReleaselD=767743 (announcing the transaction's closing is subject to approval of U.S.
regulatory agencies including CFIUS).
74. See, e.g., Raymond Barrett & David Baumann, US Regulators to Examine
Whether Smithfield Foods Sale is Kosher, FORBES (May 29, 2013, 4:29 PM), available
http://www.forbes.com/sites/mergermarket/2013/05/29/us-regulators-to-examineat
whether-smithfield-foods-sale-is-kosher/ (quoting Smithfield CEO Larry Pope as
saying he was not worried about the review, but filed with CFIUS anyway).
75. See generally Leon B. Greenfield & Perry Lange, The CFIUS Process: A
15,
available at
10,
at
2005-2006),
(Winter
Primer, THRESHOLD,
http://www.wilmerhale.com/uploadedFiles/WilmerHaleSharedContent/Files/Editoria

1/Publication/GreenfieldLangeCFIUSProcess.pdf (stating companies that file for
review and obtain a favorable approval from CFIUS cannot be reviewed again).
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prevent the Committee or President from taking any further action on a
covered transaction after the Committee has reviewed and approved the
deal.7 6 The deal was the largest Chinese takeover of an American company
following the Ralls decision, and the largest Chinese takeover of an
American company in history.n CFIUS ultimately cleared the deal without
any mitigation measures; however, the Committee took the full forty-five
day timeline to investigate any potential national security concerns.78
Unlike the Ralls transaction, which caught the public eye because it
involved a case of first impression, CFIUS practitioners watched the
Smithfield deal closely because it represented the first time the Committee
concerned itself with food safety. 7 9
II. REGULATOR TO RAILROADER: HOW A POST-RALLS CFIUS WILL IMPACT
FDI
Until 2012, no party subject to a CFIUS review, investigation, or
Presidential order based on Section 721 of the Defense Production Act
elected to challenge the scope of the Committee or President's authority.80
The last time the President and CFIUS faced intense backlash from a
decision related to a covered transaction was in 2006 when they required
Alcatel SA and Lucent technologies to sign onto a National Security
Agreement ("NSA"), which could unwind the deal if the two parties failed
at any point to comply with specific terms laid out in the NSA with

76.

See 31 C.F.R. § 800.601 (2008) (stating the Committee will not exercise its

power to block transactions if the Committee has notified parties that the transaction is
not a covered transaction, that the Committee has concluded a review, or the President
has announced that he will not act to block the transaction).
77. Louise Gong, Could the Smithfield Deal Evidence a New Trend in Chinese
Investment in the US?, LEXOLOGY (July 25, 2013), http://www.lexology.com/library/
detail.aspx?g-85dd98ae-708c-46ab-b035-ae9f59e5b022 (noting the deal may have
received less scrutiny because Shuanghui is not a State Owned Enterprise (SOE) unlike
other Chinese investments).
78. See Bill McConnell, The Deal: No CFIUS Strings Attached to Smithfield Deal,
STREET (Sept. 9, 2013, 5:02 PM), http://www.thestreet.com/story/12031338/1/the-dealno-cfius-strings-attached-to-smithfield-deal.html ("CFIUS experts picked up through
the grapevine over recent days that mitigation was indeed absent from the Smithfield
approval.").
79.
See Bill Black, U.S. Senate Hearing on Smithfield Foods Poses Challenge to
CFIUS, FORBES (July 9, 2013, 11:49 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
simonmontlake/2013/07/09/u-s-senate-hearing-on-smithfield-foods-poses-challenge-tocifus/ (noting the classification of the food supply as a national security interest
expands the scope of CFIUS and complicates U.S. trade policy trying spur FDI).
80.
Daniel B. Pickard, Nova J. Daly, & Usha Neelakantan, Ralls Case Affirms
President's Broad CFIUS Authority, WILEY REIN LLP (Mar. 14, 2013),
http://www.wileyrein.com/publications.cfm?sp=articles&id=8720#ftn4
(characterizing Ralls' decision to sue as "unprecedented").
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CFIUS.81 Ralls' decision to sue, rather than lobby the administration like
the business community following Alcatel-Lucent, triggered a series of
decisions which has unwittingly strengthened the Executive's discretionary
authority to stifle FDI, whether the Executive wishes to or not. 8 2
A.

Post Ralls.- Submitfor a review or face limitless Executive Authority

Ralls argued in Count III of its suit against CFIUS and President Obama
that, "[n]either any other provision of Section 721, nor the implementing
regulations, nor any Executive Order grants the President any powers
beyond 'suspend[ing] or prohibit[ing]' a 'covered transaction."' 8 3 Since
the parties had already completed the transaction at the time of the order,
Ralls's argument carried more weight. Section 721(d)(1) states "the
President may take such action for such time as the President considers
appropriate to suspend or prohibit any covered transaction. . . ."84 Prior
readings and prior Presidential action under this Section presumed it to
mean that the President was limited only to suspending or prohibiting a
deal, completed or pending.8 5 In 1990, the last time a president acted under
this authority, President Bush limited the scope of his order by requiring
China National Aero Technology Import and Export Corporation (CATIC)
to divest all interests in MAMCO Manufacturing, Inc. 86
JAMES K. JACKSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33388, THE COMMITTEE ON
81.
FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 6-7 (CFIUS) (2013) (describing the

arrangement as "controversial").
82.
Pelofsky, supra note 55 (describing a number of U.S. and international
business groups objecting to the Bush administration's policy decision).
83.
Amended Complaint, supra note 65 at 1 133 (arguing in Count III that the
President's action was ultra vires and violated the statute and regulations).
84. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(d)(1) (emphasizing the specific options laid out in the
statutory language).
85.
Compare Amended Complaint, supra note 64, at ¶ 133 ("The President may
only 'take such action for such time as the President considers appropriate to suspend
or prohibit any covered transaction.' Neither any other provision of Section 721, nor
the implementing regulations, nor any Executive Order grants the President any powers
beyond 'suspend[ing] or prohibit[ing]' a 'covered transaction."') with MEREDITH M.
BROWN, ET. AL, TAKEOVERS: A STRATEGIC GUIDE TO MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS, 1333 (3d ed. 2013) (limiting the discussion of options open to the President at the end of
the fifteen day timeline to suspension or prohibition of a covered transaction).
86. See Message to Congress on the China National Aero-Technology Import and
Export Corporation Divestiture of MAMCO Manufacturing, Incorporated, 26 WEEKLY
COMP. PRES. Doc. 164 (Feb. 2, 1990) [hereinafter Message on CNATL & MAMCO]
(noting there are limited exceptions to when the U.S. government will act contrary to
its policy of maintaining an open investment landscape); see also Harriet King, China
Ends Silence on Deal U.S. Rescinded, N.Y. TIMES (February 20, 1990),
http://www.nytimes.com/1990/02/20/business/china-ends-silence-on-deal-usrescinded.html (noting the deal closed on November 30 and President Bush issued his
order on February 2 following a recommendation from eight agencies (CFIUS) that the
purchase be rescinded).
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While the Executive Orders pertaining to CATIC and Ralls constituted
presidential action on finalized deals, Ralls faced numerous other
burdensome requirements that CATIC did not.87 The Court determined the
President's right to exercise this power came from the expressed statutory
language in front of the words, "suspend" and "prohibit," specifically the
clause "take such action for such time as the President considers
appropriate." 8 This adds a new level of uncertainty to an already secretive
and vague process. 8 9 There are statutory limitations for the allotted time
the Committee has to review and investigate a transaction, thirty and forty
five days, respectively. 90 Additionally, Section 721 limits the President's
decision to announce whether he will take action pursuant to the
Committee's recommendation to fifteen days following the end of an
investigation. 91 "Such time," however, has no limit under the Court's
interpretation, which permits the President to retroactively unwind deals. 92
By prefacing subsequent action with "in order to effectuate" the suspension
or prohibition, the President can invoke the statutory power of "such action
for such time" that is necessary to effectuate his Order. 93 This gives the
President broad latitude to engage in retroactive review of closed deals and
require and restrict action by the parties- action that is difficult, if not
impossible, to predict.9 4 Furthermore, in the context of suspending a deal,
the President could conceivably require that parties to a transaction remain
87.
Compare Regarding the Acquisition of Four U.S. Wind Farm Project
Companies by Ralls Corporation, 77 Fed. Reg. 60,281, 60,282 (Oct. 3, 2012)
(preventing Rails from selling the property to a third party until it complied with
provisions in subsection (f)(i)-(iii)) with Message on CNATI and MAMCO, supra note
86 (limiting the order to divestiture and not imposing more burdensome restrictions on
the parties).
See Rails Corp. v. Comm. on Foreign Inv. In the United States, 925 F. Supp.
88.
2d 71, 89 (D.D.C. 2013) (emphasis added) (stating "for such time" is an open ended
temporal phrase granting the President an unlimited period of time to take action
necessary to accomplish or implement the prohibition of a deal).
See 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(c) (2012) ("Any information or documentary
89.
material filed with the President or the President's designee pursuant to this section
shall be exempt from disclosure[.]").
90.
50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(b)(1)(E), (2)(C) (2012).
91.
50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(d)(2) (2012) ("Not later than 15 days after the date on
which an investigation . . . is completed.").
92. See Ralls Corp., 926 F. Supp. 2d at 88 (stating if the President were limited to
just a decision on whether to prohibit or permit a deal prior to its closing, he would not
need an unlimited period of time granted to him with the phrase, "for such time").
93. See id. (describing the sequence of Presidential action to include a declaration
that a transaction is prohibited even it the deal has closed, then classifying further
action as steps necessary to prohibit the transaction).
94. See id. (discussing the President's order, which called for a removal of Chinese
turbines, prevention of their use in the future, and restrictions on foreign nationals
accessing the wind farm).
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in some type of perpetual limbo because he "consider[ed] [such action]
appropriate to suspend" a covered transaction. 95 It is conceivable that the
President could require the divestiture of any transactions deemed to
threaten national security that occurred after FINSA, but were not reviewed
by CFIUS.
Under the court's interpretation, "such action" is also an open-ended
term that increases unpredictability.9 6 The Presidential Order, in Section 2,
subsection (b) ordered Ralls to divest all interests in the wind farms, a
move comparable to President Bush's requirements for Alcatel.97
However, President Obama went far beyond Alcatel by blocking or
prohibiting: (1) access to the properties by anyone from or acting on behalf
of Ralls, (2) the sale of the property to a third party without meeting certain
conditions, and (3) the use of any items made by a particular Chinese firm
for use at the location.98 The court did not elaborate on its reasoning,
simply declaring these orders as "such action" necessary to prohibit the
Ralls transaction.99 Furthermore, the court did not clarify a standard for
determining when a particular action is sufficiently related to the
prohibition of a transaction to be classified as "such action . . . the President
considers appropriate." 00 Therefore, the court takes a very broad and
permissive stance on the statutory language surrounding the limits (or lack
thereof) of the President's authority.
As long as the President's actions fall within the undefined "such action
at such time" category, parties to a covered transaction face no other option
than to take advantage of the "safe harbor" provision.' 0' The affirmation
that the President's ruling is not subject to judicial redress underscores the

95.
See id. (stating "the statute expressly authorizes the President to do what he
deems necessary to accomplish or implement the prohibition." Since Ralls dealt with
the prohibition of a deal, the discussion in this sense stops there; however, it is fair to
assume the same interpretation applies to the President's ability to do whatever is
necessary to effectuate a "suspension" of the deal.).
96.
See id. at 89 (noting what the President deems necessary is up to his
judgment).
97.
Regarding the Acquisition of Four U.S. Wind Farm Project Companies by
Ralls Corporation, 77 Fed. Reg. 60,281, 60,282 (Oct. 3, 2012).
98. Id.
99.
Ralls Corp., 926 F. Supp. 2d at 89 (stating the additional restrictions fell within
the scope of the President's authority but failing to elaborate how or why).
100. See id. (noting the Defense Production Act affords the President broad
authority but providing no explanation or reasoning why certain actions are necessary
in order to effectuate the prohibition of the transaction instead highlighting that the
actions are not reviewable).
101. See 31 C.F.R. § 800.601 (2008) (discussing when the President's divestment
authority will not be available).
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importance of submitting to a review.' 02 If the Committee, during the
review period, determines not to undertake an investigation of a covered
transaction or the Committee determines, at the end of an investigation, not
to take further action, then the President "shall not" exercise his authority
available to him under Section 721(d).1 0 3 It offers the only sense of
predictability in an otherwise unpredictable process.
B.

Ham is CriticalInfrastructureSo Your Deal Is Probably Covered Too

Since CFIUS reviews each case on a fact specific basis, it follows that
there is no precedential value for the Committee's past rulings when
compared with future rulings. 04 While this holds true for the decisions the
Committee makes when it reviews covered transactions, it is still valuable
for companies to know which transactions are chosen for review.' 05
Companies can only guess whether their deal will be a covered transaction
based on a variety of statutory factors and prior reviews within their
respective industry.' 06 The perception among investors is that CFIUS
reviewing one deal means it is likely to review similar transactions.
The Smithfield-Shuanghui deal represented the first time CFIUS
reviewed a merger dealing with food supply. 0 7 The deal likely fell within
the reach of CFIUS because Smithfield is the largest pork producer in the
United States and "has a significant impact on U.S. food supply."'s While

102. Ralls Corp., 926 F. Supp. 2d at 89 ("[T]his Court finds that the challenged
action 'is of the sort shielded from review."').
103. See 31 C.F.R. §§ 800.601(a), (a)(2).
104.

COMM.

ON FOREIGN INV.

IN

THE UNITED

STATES,

ANNUAL

REPORT

TO

3 (2013),
available at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/
international/foreigninvestment/Documents/201 3%20CFIUS%2OAnnual%20Report%20PUBLIC.pdf
("Apart from the general correlation of the number of notices with macroeconomic
conditions, the information in the table ... is not indicative of discernable trends.
CFIUS considers each transaction on a case-by-case basis[.]").
105. Cf Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States Filing Instructions,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, available at http://www.treasury.gov/resourcecenter/international/foreign-investment/Pages/cfius-filing-instructions.aspx
("CFRUS
does not issue advisory opinions as to whether a transaction might raise national
security concerns or be considered a covered transaction subject to review.").
106. See 31 C.F.R. § 800.208 (2008) (defining "critical infrastructure" broadly with
general terms like "system" and "asset" forcing companies to look to previous deals
within a specific industry to determine whether the deal fell into this category in order
to make a determination of whether this definition applies).
107. See McConnell, supra note 78 (stating CFIUS experts believe the Committee's
review for food safety concerns would be a first).
108. See "Re: Shuanghui's International Holdings, Ltd. proposed purchase of
Smithfield Foods," Letter from Concerned Industry Players (July 9, 2013) [hereinafter
"Letter to Cabinet Members Expressing Opposition of Smithfield Deal"] available at
http://www.chinaustradelawblog.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/164/2013/07/farmCONGRESS
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most would agree that the domestic food supply should fall within the
definition of critical infrastructure, especially because "the incapacity or
destruction of the particular system . . would have a debilitating impact on
national security," it is the companies' stated reason for filing, "an
abundance of caution," and the subsequent precedent it sets for potential
deals within the industry that is a troubling indicator of a widening CFIUS
net. 109

As noted before, the deal emerged without mitigation.1 o The President
cannot suspend or prohibit a transaction where other provisions of law
"provide adequate and appropriate authority" to protect the nation's
Since the food industry is already highly regulated, the
security."'
Committee may have felt any mitigation efforts on their part would be
unnecessary, if not illegal, because of U.S. Department of Agriculture
oversight.11 2 But the damage is done.
CFIUS sent a signal to foreign companies contemplating investing in the
U.S. domestic food market when it accepted the Smithfield-Shuanghui
filing and conducted a forty-five day investigation: food is on our list." 3
Smithfield shows the problems associated with leaving an ambiguous
definition for what constitutes critical infrastructure. By failing to define
letter-on-cfius.pdf (calling for CFIUS to block the merger because the deal threatens

-

the security of the nation's food supply); see also Smithfield and Beyond- Examining
ForeignPurchasesofAmerican Food Companies:Hearing Before S. Comm. on Agric.,
Nutrition, and Forestry, I12th Cong. (2013) (statement of Sen. Debbie Stabenow,
Chairman, S. Comm. on Agric., Nutrition, and Forestry) (describing food security as
essential to the national security and declaring it essential to examine the impact of the
deal on the nation's food supply).
109. See 31 C.F.R. § 800.208 (2008) (defining critical infrastructure broadly to
include physical and virtual assets); Press Release, Smithfield Int'l Holdings, supra
note 73 (describing the companies' motives to submit as "out of an abundance of
caution").
110. See e.g., McConnell, supra note 78 (stating CFIUS cleared the deal with no
strings attached).
Ill. Cf 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(d)(4)(B) (2012) (stating whether a particular
provision of law adequately protects the nation's security is up to the judgment of the
President).
112. See 31 CFR § 800.101 (2008) (limiting the scope of the President's authority
by prohibiting action when other provisions of law can adequately protect the nation's
security).
113. See Louise Gong & Amanda Forsythe, CFIUS and Chinese Investments:
Lessons from the Smithfield Deal, LEXOLOGY (November 26, 2013),
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g-8d72c8al-d89b-4d95-83a29e5143d66f37 ("A 45 day investigation was undertaken by CFIUS against a highly
political backdrop, with CFIUS being asked to look into how food safety and food
security threats may affect national security[.]"); see also Smithfield and Beyond
Examining Foreign Purchases of American Food Companies, supra note 108
(describing Shuanghui's acquisition as the first, but not the last and calling for an
examination of the approval process because of the case's precedent setting nature).
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the category more thoroughly, any foreign company looking to enter into a
broad array of industries will feel forced to submit for a review "out of an
abundance of caution."I14
The Smithfield review sent another sign to investors: the loose definition
of critical infrastructure can be a political tool.'l5 The events surrounding
Numerous agricultural organizations
the review support this notion.
opposed the purchase in a letter to Cabinet members who sit on CFIUS."16
Additionally, the U.S. Senate Committee on Agriculture held a hearing in
July 2013 to examine the deal." 7 Nowhere in the CFIUS mandate does it
permit the Committee to examine a deal for the economic impact it might
have on competition." 8 Examining the deal under the guise of food
security, however, helped placate the interests of the industry and of
members of Congress. As a result, foreign investors party to large
acquisitions in industries not traditionally covered by CFIUS may feel
forced to submit for review because political and industry pressure could
push CFIUS to initiate a non-notified review after a deal has begun." 9
If Smithfield-Shuanghui's "abundance of caution" included submitting
the deal because of its unprecedented value, this is the sign of another
disturbing trend, particularly because CFIUS is not charged with looking
into these economic impacts.1 20 In 2012, CFIUS reviewed, and ultimately
cleared, the acquisition of AMC Entertainment by Dalian Wanda Group for

114. See Press Release, Smithfield Int'l Holdings, supra note 73.
115. See Black, supra note 79 (stating CFIUS is not authorized to look at the
economic impact of a deal and arguing a U.S. Senate Hearing held during the review
period was aimed at putting pressure on CFlUS to conduct a very close review).
116. See Letter to Cabinet Members Expressing Opposition of Smithfield Deal,
supra note 108 (arguing the nation's food supply should fall into the definition of
critical infrastructure and noting the extensive contracts Smithfield has with the U.S.
military and arguing the deal would threaten the ability of the military to feed troops).
117. See, e.g., Edward Wyatt, Senators Question Chinese Takeover of Smithfield,
N.Y. TIMES, B7, July 10, 2013, available at http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/
07/1 0/lawmakers-have-concerns-over-chinese-takeover-of-smithfield/?.php-true&
type=blogs&_r-0 (discussing lawmakers' concerns and over the deal and noting
sixteen members of the Agriculture Committee sent a letter to the Treasury Department
asking Treasury to include the Department of Agriculture and the Food and Drug
Administration in the CFIUS review process for the deal).
118. See 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(f) (2012) (listing various factors the President and
Committee can consider including the impact on the nation's defense apparatus and
international leadership in technology but not mentioning economic impacts). But see
Smithfield and Beyond - Examining Foreign PurchasesofAmerican Food Companies,
supra note 108 (encouraging CFIUS to factor in the nation's economic security when
reviewing a transaction for national security implications).
119. Cf Barrett & Baumann, supra note 74 (discussing the ways in which industry
competitors can use political tools such as lobbyists to interfere with pending
transactions).
120. See 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(f) (2012).
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$2.6 billion.121 The transaction fell under the "covered transaction"
requirement; however, its impact on national security is questionable. 22 Is
AMC's ownership and operation of 338 movie theaters around the United
States considered "so vital" that the incapacitation of the business would
"have a debilitating impact on national security?"12 3 Like Smithfield, AMC

was an acquisition by a Chinese firm of large stakeholders in an industry
symbolic of American culture: entertainment. It is more likely that the
parties submitted the transaction for review because of the deal's large
value; at the time, it was the largest completed Chinese-US acquisition in
history.1 2 4 Since CFIUS does not have a mandate to review transactions for
economic impacts, the idea that companies are submitting for review
because of the value of a deal rather than the potential that it falls within
the CFIUS mandate is disturbing. As a result of this review, China- based
investors entering into high valued deals in the entertainment industry, and
investors from other countries with sensitive diplomatic ties, may feel
pressured to submit for review.1 2 5
C.

Internationalvs. Domestic Investors: More PowerMeans More
Filings Which PutInternationalInvestors in Second

There were 155 notices filed with CFIUS in 2008, up from 138 the
previous year.126 During that same time, Congress passed FINSA and
President Bush implemented the law at the beginning of 2008, the last

121. See JAMES K. JACKSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERv., RS 21857, FOREIGN DIRECT
INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 9 (2013). (discussing
prior high profile cases CFIUS reviewed).
122. See id. (describing the deal as an acquisition therefore constituting control of a
U.S. business by a foreign person).
123. See id. (describing AMC Entertainment's business operation); see also 31
C.F.R. § 800.208 (2008) (defining critical infrastructure).
124. See Thilo Hanemann, Chinese FDI in the United States: Q3 2012 Update,
RHODIUM GROUP (Oct. 18, 2012), http://rhg.com/notes/chinese-fdi-in-the-united-statesq3-2012-update (valuing the deal at $2.6 billion).

125. See, e.g., William Mauldin Chinese Firms Lead in Seeking Deals Needing U.S.
Security Clearance, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 19, 2013, 10:57 PM), http://online.wsj.com/
news/articles/SB10001424052702304773104579268722994281350 (noting Chinese
firms filed 23 acquisitions in 2012 compared to 13 in 2011 and highlighting that only
six of the twenty-three acquisitions involved critical technology); cf Smithfield and

Beyond - Examining Foreign Purchases of American Food Companies, supra note
108, at 6 (statement of Daniel M. Slane, US-China Econ. and Sec. Review Comm'n.)
(showing the political nature of reviews when Congress is involved by concluding his
remarks with the recommendation that Congress re-examine FDI from China and
determine whether FINSA should be amended to include an economic benefits test).
126. See COMM. ON FOREIGN INV. IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 104 at 3
(table).

2015

THE EXPANDING REACH OF THE EXECUTIVE IN FDI

147

major change and clarification related to the CFIUS process.1 27 The jump
represents a precautionary reaction by the private sector attempting to
adjust to new, broader regulations for FDI. Of those 155 notices, eighteen
were withdrawn during review, twenty-three were investigated, and five
were withdrawn during the investigation period.1 28
The companies
associated with all 155 acquisitions were forced to wait a minimum of
thirty additional days to close on a deal. Twenty-three out of these 155
transactions, which is fourteen percent of all notices, had to wait an
additional forty-five days for clearance from the investigation phase.
These excess delays represent a minor inconvenience for most
transactions; however, in a post-Ralls environment, where firns are filing
out of fear and uncertainty, the delays are an unnecessary impediment for
most who will submit for review. 12 9 In 2012, there were 114 notices and
forty-five investigations.1 30 Forty percent of covered transactions filed in
2012 were stalled for seventy-five days of regulatory review.
Companies facing a regulatory delay are often subject to very public and
politicized scrutiny.1 31 One deal, the acquisition of Sprint-Nextel Corp. by
Japan's SoftBank Corp, highlights how a regulatory delay in a system filled
with ambiguity could be disastrous to international investors.1 3 2 DISH
Network, a competitor with SoftBank in the deal, launched a lobbying
campaign arguing outstanding national security concerns.1 33 Leaving a

127.

JAMES K. JACKSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERv., RL 33388, THE
FOREIGN
INVESTMENT
IN THE UNITED
STATES (CFIUS)
7

See generally

COMMITTEE

ON

(2013).(describing the amended process post FINSA).
128. See COMM. ON FOREIGN INV. IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 104 at 3
(stating the increase in withdrawals in 2012 is a result of specific facts and
circumstances of the particular transaction).
129. See Amanda Forsythe, "But I'm Canadian!" and Other CFIUS Dilemmas,
CHADBOURNE & PARKE LLP (Dec. 2013), http://www.chadboume.com/files/
Publication/37853f8d-ff78-42e4-a84d-3f65bdcOlbda/Presentation/Publication
Attachment/8f284480-8084-45c6-bced-445635e89eec/CanadianCFIUSDilemmas
_Decl3.PDF. ("Although there are statutory deadlines for certain phases of the process,
the exact timing of the process is hard to predict.").
130.

See COMM. ON FOREIGN INV. IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 104 at 3

(stating the increase in number of notices filed from 2010 to 2012 coincides with the
continued recovery from the financial crisis of 2008-2009).
131. See, e.g., Peter Overby, Lobbyist's Last-Minute Bid Set Off Ports Controversy,
NAT'L PUB.
RADIO (March
8, 2006,
4:00 PM),
http://www.npr.org/
templates/story/story.php?storyld=5252263 (discussing a lobbyist's campaign to bring
increased scrutiny to the DP World deal on Capitol Hill).
132. See Alina Selyukh, Spring, Softbank agree to U.S. National Security Deal,
REUTERS (May 29, 2013, 6:27 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/29/ussprint-offer-idUSBRE94SOIG20130529 (describing as aggressive DISH Network's
attempts to convince lawmakers that the transaction would threaten the nation's
security).
133. See, e.g., DISH Statement on Softbank and CFIUS, DISH NETWORK CORP.
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deal open for seventy-five days gives a leg-up to domestic companies
looking to acquire target companies. They are not subject to the same
delay and may be more appealing to shareholders should CFIUS find it
needs to further investigate, or ultimately mitigate, a deal. Hormel Foods
Corporation, a domestic competitor of Smithfield, declined to say whether
it would lobby against Shuanghui when the deal was under review.1 34
Hormel did not act and DISH was unsuccessful in its attempts; however,
the threat is real. Shell Gas successfully lobbied Congress to introduce
legislation in 2005 that would have stifled the bid by China National
Offshore Oil Corporation ("CNOOC") to acquire the U.S. based oil
company, Unocal.' 35 CNOOC eventually abandoned the transaction amid
public backlash.1 36
It would be imprudent to say these reviews served no purpose; however,
as more companies subject themselves to CFIUS review because of endless
uncertainty, international investors remain at a severe disadvantage when
they challenge U.S.-based companies in a bidding war.' 37 "There is a
concern about the length of time that the deals are taking and whether or
not [the companies] feel like they are at a disadvantage." 38 When
companies feel like they must self-report out of caution and due diligence,
the United States presents itself as a protectionist investment market
suspicious of outsiders.1 3 9

(May 23, 2013, 6:00 AM), http://about.dish.com/press-release/financial/dish-statementsoftbank-and-cfius (pointing to serious national security risks of SoftBank acquiring
Spring and calling on Congress to scrutinize the CFIUS review process).
134. See Barrett & Baumann, supra note 74 (highlighting the risks Smithfield
would face if Hormel attempted to lobby Congress to block the transaction).
135. See id. (comparing what Shell did to the CNOOC - Unocal deal to what
Hormel could do to the Smithfield-Shuanghui deal).
136. See id.; see also Isabella Steger, Cnooc's Unocal Lessons, WALL ST. J. BLOGS
(July 23, 2012, 10:10 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/deals/2012/07/23/enoocs-unocallessons/ (describing the deal as a poster child for what happens when U.S.-China trade
issues get in the way of a deal).
137. Cf Smithfield and Beyond - Examining Foreign Purchasesof American Food
Companies, supra note 108, at 6 (statement of Daniel M. Slane, US-China Econ. and
Sec. Review Comm'n.) (stating Congress should expect a wave of Chinese investment
in the U.S. food and agriculture industry, which means these parties will feel obligated
to submit for CFIUS reviews regardless of whether the deal is covered under the
statutory guidelines).
138. See CFIUS Chair Stays Silent on Specifics, MAIN JUST. (March 26, 2012,
11:24
AM),
http://www.mainjustice.com/2012/03/26/cfius-chair-stays-silent-onspecifics/ (quoting Nancy McLemon, president and CEO of the Organization for
International Investment)
139. See, cf 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(b)(2)(B)(i)(lI) (2012) (requiring CFIUS to
investigate covered transactions when the acquirer is or is backed by a foreign
government which means the acquiring company has the burden of proof to show it is
not a threat to the security of the nation).
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III. THE NEED FOR CLARITY

Following the Ralls decisions, CFIUS faces an identity crisis. On the
one hand, the Committee must remain vigilant in its mandate to ensure its
first priority, the nation's security, when reviewing covered transactions.
This is all the more important when viewed amidst the backdrop of the
Committee's inclusion in its public annual report of a U.S. Intelligence
Community Assessment stating "that foreign governments are extremely
likely to continue to use a range of collection methods to obtain critical
U.S. technologies."1 4 0 On the other hand, it is the Obama Administration's
stated goal that it wishes to encourage FDI, a goal traditionally left to the
states, but which the administration deems important enough to bring under
the umbrella of the Federal Government. 14 1 The question is how CFIUS
can conform to the goal of promoting what historically has made America
an attractive investment landscape, specifically an "open investment"
climate and a "predictable and stable regulatory regime."1 42
In order to reconcile this split, CFIUS and the Executive must increase
transparency and predictability in the review process by changing the
policy on advisory opinions. Asking the Committee to definitively state
what "national security" entails would be impossible. Furthermore, it is in
the interest of the nation not to limit the meaning of national security
because of the ever-changing domestic and international milieu. 143 But the
Committee could issue advisory opinions following a determination that a
particular transaction is not covered if that particular transaction does not
fall within the purview of "critical infrastructure." The Committee can
determine a transaction is not covered or that there are no outstanding
national security concerns under sections 800.504 or 800.506 of its
140. See COMM. ON FOREIGN INV. IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 104, at 29
(answering the question of whether foreign governments used espionage activities to
obtain commercial secrets related to critical technologies).
141. See Politi, supra note 9 (stating, in the past, the federal government has
avoided large scale initiatives targeting foreign investment and leaving this to state
governments).
142. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE & PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS,

supra note 6, at 11 (noting most investments originate from industrialized countries,
but highlighting the role emerging markets will play as those countries continue to
grow economically).
143.

Compare, cf THE WHITE HOUSE, THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (2002), available at http://nssarchive.us/NSSR/2002.pdf;
with THE WHITE HOUSE, THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES

OF AMERICA (2006), available at http://nssarchive.us/NSSR/2006.pdf and THE WHITE
HOUSE, THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

(2010),
available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss-viewer/
nationalsecurity-strategy.pdf (noting the need to revise strategies three times in eight
years in order to better respond to a evolving threats and an unpredictable global
landscape).
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regulations.
The finality of the action should permit the Committee to issue a public
opinion describing why it chose not to review a transaction. 144 This would
require acquiescence on behalf of members to the particular transaction;
however, achieving this likely would not be difficult, especially because
the publicized opinion would involve a transaction that is not covered.
Currently, parties that submit to a review may withdraw a notice prior "to
conclusion of all action under section 721."l45 Doing so helps avoid an
unfavorable ruling and parties can resubmit at a later time.1 4 6 Parties to a
transaction understandably may wish to avoid public knowledge of a
withdrawal because of financial implications; however, publication of a
decision by CFIUS not to review, investigate, or rule on a transaction
would not carry the same negative consequences. It would require an
adjustment of the regulations under 31 C.F.R. § 800.702, which prohibit
the Committee from disclosing information filed even after a
"determin[ation] that a notified transaction is not a covered transaction." 4 7
Accordingly, it would be in the interest of the business community to
acquiesce to this change in regulation.
The Committee could shed more light on its decision-making process by
explaining its justification for negative rulings. National security concerns
make it difficult, and likely illegal, for a full debrief of why the Committee
ultimately recommended the suspension or prohibition of a deal. This
would involve a breakdown of rulings into broad categories, which would
provide guidance without giving specific reasons that might involve
decisions based on classified material.
Currently, the Committee, in its annual report to Congress, breaks down
notified covered transactions by sector.148 Among the sectors included are
Manufacturing; Finance, Information and Services; and Mining, Utilities,
and Transportation.
The categories are further broken down into
subcategories that give a general idea of the sub-industry in which the deal
originated; however, the information is not enough to gamer specifics
144. See 31 C.F.R. §§ 800.504, 800.506(d), & 800.601 (2008) (describing the
various points in the CFIUS process where finality provisions kick in).
145. See § 800.507(a) (2008) (stating requests to withdrawal from a review will
ordinarily be granted, but reserving the Committee's right to deny the withdrawal
request).
146. See § 800.507(c)(2) (2008) (stating the Committee will specify a time frame
for a resubmission).
147. See § 800.702(b)(3) (2008) (stating the regulation covering confidentiality will
continue to apply even though a decision has been reached).
148. COMM. ON FOREIGN INV. IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 104, at 4 (noting
the greatest number of filings in 2012 occurred in the manufacturing and finance
sectors).
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about the "critical technology" involved, as might be the case for
Manufacturing's "semiconductor" subsector. The Committee could create
similar categories to reflect negative rulings. It was reported that the wind
farms purchased by Ralls were within or adjacent to U.S. military
instillations.1 4 9 The Committee could classify this ruling under a category
entitled "situational concerns." This gives guidance to future investors who
might attempt to acquire property in proximity to sensitive locations.
Citing "situational concerns" as a reason for a negative ruling would do
little to threaten or reveal sensitive information related to national security.
Although CFIUS cleared the SoftBank-Sprint deal last spring, it placed
conditions on the clearance in order to mitigate outstanding concerns
related to SoftBank's use of equipment made by a Chinese company.' 50 In
this instance, the Committee could site "technological concerns" as its
reason for requiring the mitigation measures.
This makes potential
investors aware that mergers and acquisitions resulting in foreign control of
telecommunication companies likely fall under the "critical infrastructure"
or "critical technology" rubric. The importance is to develop guidance and
clarity, not specifics and pinpointed answers for those looking to invest.
Further clarification for rulings provides guidance for foreign investors,
something that supports the administration's goal of remaining an open
marketplace with a predictable regulatory landscape. It also prevents
misperception, a worry that should be at the forefront of the Committee's
mind. Guidance on negative rulings or rulings involving mitigation could
help reduce unnecessary filings, which would reduce the misperception
from investors who might reside in countries with less than ideal
diplomatic relations with the United States.
CONCLUSION

The Committee reviews a small fraction of total deals involving foreign
acquisition of U.S.-based companies. The direct economic impact of
CFIUS' review of transactions is difficult to measure; however, unless the
Committee clarifies its policies in light of its new power and reach, it risks
alienating certain foreign companies from investing in the United States.
Ralls has shown the world the dangers of what may happen when parties
forge ahead with an acquisition without submitting first for clearance by
CFIUS. Not only can the President block a deal, but he can undo a deal
and require seemingly boundless actions and restrictions in order to
149. See Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss, supra note
65, at 4.
150. See Selyukh, supra note 132 (citing sources who stated SoftBank agreed to
remove equipment from Sprint and Clearwire Corp's networks made by Huawei
Technologies Co Ltd., a Chinese company, if the deal was completed by 2016).
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effectuate the order. The heavy-handed action chips away at the open,
predictable, and stable economy that draws in foreign capital.
Smithfield-Shuanghui is an example of what to expect unless CFIUS can
provide more guidance and transparency in its review process. Foreign
firms will submit for review because the cost-benefit analysis post-Ralls
demands it. The current administration risks driving the U.S. economy
down a path where FDI is presumptively suspect. When companies feel
the need, as a default, to submit for a review, the Committee risks entering
the territory where companies feel as though they must show they are not a
threat. New industries will fall under the "critical infrastructure" umbrella,
which will drive more investors to self-report to CFIUS. Whether the deal
is actually covered under the "critical infrastructure" definition is
immaterial without transparency, advisory opinions, or further clarification.

